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HOW IS SEX HARASSMENT DISCRIMINATORY?
Noa Ben-Asher*
What is sexual harassment, and what is its actual harm? Since the 1980s, these
1
two questions have perplexed lawmakers, policymakers, feminists, and the public.
Today, with the rise of #MeToo, and with increased national attention to Title IX
claims regarding sexual violence on college campuses, these questions are once
again in the spotlight. As some commentators have observed, in the last several
years lawmakers and policymakers have been increasingly influenced by a feminist
2
antisubordination approach to sexual harassment and assault. This growing
influence is currently reflected in more strict standards of consent (“affirmative
consent”) to sex, in higher procedural and substantive burdens on those accused of
sexual harassment or assault, and in closer governmental monitoring of institutional
settings, such as public universities.
3
Feminist Judgments takes us to a key moment in the history of sexual
4
harassment law. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court recognized
for the first time that both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment
5
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It also held that to be actionable
6
under Title VII, sexual advances must be (1) “unwelcome” and (2) “sufficiently
severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create
7
an abusive working environment.’” The latter part of the test (“sufficiently severe
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copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and includes
this provision and copyright notice.
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4 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
5 See id. at 65.
6 Id. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1985)).
7 Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
“Unwelcome” conduct has typically been understood as one which an employee did not solicit or
incite and which is regarded as undesirable or offensive. See Kristen Konrad Tiscione,
Commentary on Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 3, at 297,
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or pervasive”) fits well into the liberal-feminist judicial attitudes in the 1970s and
1980s that emphasized gender equality and the integration of women in the
8
workplace. The problem with sexual harassment under this Ginsburgian liberal
framework is that it impairs the equal participation of women in the workplace. The
first part of the Meritor test (unwelcomeness), however, has been subject to intense
debates among feminists. What does it mean for a sexual advance to be unwelcome?
Is the test objective or subjective? Does welcomeness have to be conveyed
affirmatively? Can passive silence indicate welcomeness? Does provocative dress
matter? The answers to these questions often depend on the branch of feminist
thought that appeals to you. For instance, according to antisubordination feminism,
the primary harm of sexual harassment is sexual subordination: men use sexuality
9
as a primary means to subordinate women to male power. By contrast, for liberal
feminism, the focus is not so much on sexual subordination as it is on unequal
10
opportunity in the workplace.
Interestingly, the fascinating feminist rewriting of Meritor by Angela
Onwuachi-Willig reflects the large-scale shift toward antisubordination feminism in
sexual harassment law. Most importantly, Onwuachi-Willig rejects Meritor’s
unwelcomeness standard. As Kristen Konrad Tiscione explains, the unwelcomeness
test “distracts the decisionmaker from what should be the central inquiry: the
behavior of the harasser and the effect of that behavior on both the workplace and
11
the victim.” Namely, the problem with the unwelcomeness test is that due to power
differentials between supervisor and subordinate, it is common for a subordinate to
12
say “yes” if they wish to “be accepted, get promoted, or save [their] job.”
Onwuachi-Willig’s normative position is that Title VII is violated by acts that
“unreasonably interfere with the complainant’s work performance, create a hostile
or intimidating environment, and/or help to preserve patterns of sex segregation in
13
employment.” If harassment enforces “the notion of the dominant and powerful
14
man over the subordinate woman,” a hostile environment exists. In addition, the
work environment ought to be evaluated from the perspective of a “reasonable

298 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 903). The Court also concluded that Vinson’s clothes and speech
were relevant to the merits of her claim (under EEOC guidelines “the totality of circumstances” are
to be evaluated in sexual harassment claim), Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 69, and that
employers are not automatically liable for hostile environment sexual harassment by supervisors.
Id. at 72.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes Virginia from maintaining a males-only public institution of higher learning
in the VMI); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (mandating the provision of equal
benefits to both servicemen and servicewomen serving in the military); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (recognizing under the Fourteenth Amendment the unconstitutionality of a statutory
preference for males when selecting an estate administrator); see also Noa Ben-Asher, The Two
Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187 (2016).
9 See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989).
10 Id.
11 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 3, at 301 (emphasis added).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 315.
14 Id. at 316.
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victim in the complainant’s shoes,” and “dress is not relevant to the inquiry of
16
welcomeness.” In contrast with the original Supreme Court decision, OnwuachiWillig also finds employers “strictly liable” for the actions of their employees
because they are “best positioned to communicate to all employees how they must
17
treat others in the workplace.” Under this strict liability standard, employers could
be perfectly vigilant, yet be held liable for an employee’s sexual harassment of
another by mere relationship of employment.
In this feminist rewriting of Meritor, the legal investigation into sexual
harassment in the workplace does not explicitly include an inquiry into what the
complainant wanted or even communicated to the accused. The question of
unwelcomeness is left out. What matters is how the accused behaved. This feminist
judgment, which echoes antisubordination feminism, has important overlaps with
the current shifts toward greater regulation of sex on college campuses and
18
“affirmative consent” standards. While it is beyond the scope of this Essay to
assess whether the growing dominance of antisubordination feminism in this area of
law is desirable, it will be interesting to see whether the influence of #MeToo will
lead courts, lawmakers, and employers, toward the more plaintiff-friendly standards
suggested by Onwuachi-Willig.
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See Gruber, supra note 2, at 429–40; Halley, supra note 2.

